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The Great Recession of 2008/2009 was characterized by the most severe year over year 
decline in consumption since 1945. The consumption slump was both deep and long lived. It 
took almost 12 quarters for total real Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) to go back to 
its level at the previous peak (2007:Q4). 
This article documents key facts about aggregate consumption and its subcomponents 
over  time  and  looks at the behavior of  important determinants of consumption, such as 
consumers’ expectations about their future income, and changes in the consumers’ wealth 
positions due to changes in house prices and stock valuation. Then, the article uses a simple 
permanent income model to determine whether the observed drop in consumption can be 
explained by the observed drops in wealth and income expectations. 
The data analysis  starts by using  macroeconomic data to study the behavior of 
consumption and its subcomponents. The analysis then turns to microeconomic data from the 
University of Michigan Survey of Consumers to study nominal expected income growth and 
inflationary expectations. 
Our main findings from the Macro data are the following. First, the Great Recession 
marked the most severe and persistent decline in aggregate consumption since WWII. All 
subcomponents of consumption declined during this period.  However,  the large drop in 
services consumption stands out most compared to previous recessions. Second, while the 
decline was historic, the time path of consumption and its subcomponents leading up the 
recession was not substantially different from past recessionary periods.  Third, the recovery 
path of consumption following the Great Recession has been uncharacteristically weak. It took 
nearly three years for total consumption to return to its level just prior to the recession. In 
contrast, the second worst rebound observed in the data followed the 1974 recession and 
lasted just over one year. We find that this persistence is reflected most in the subcomponents 
of non-durables and especially services consumption.    
Our main findings from the analysis of the Micro data are as follows. First, expected 
nominal income growth declined significantly during the Great Recession. It is the worst drop 
ever observed in these data, and it has not yet fully recovered to pre-recession levels. Second, 3 
 
the  decline exists for all age groups, education levels, and  income quintiles.    Relative to 
previous recessions,  however,  those with higher levels of income and education are more 
pessimistic than their poorer and less educated counterparts. Third, expectations for real 
income growth have also declined, and the decline in expected real income growth is more 
severe when personal inflation expectations are used instead of actual CPI inflation. Fourth, 
expected income growth is a strong predictor of actual future income growth.  Since expected 
income growth is a very important determinant of consumption decisions, the observed drop in 
expected income has the potential to explain at least part of the observed decline in 
consumption. 
In the context of a simple permanent income model, we find that the negative wealth 
effect  (coming from decreased  stock market valuation and housing prices)  and decreased 
consumers’ income expectations were big factors in determining the observed consumption 
drop. In fact, we find that in this model the observed drops in wealth and income expectations 
can explain the observed drop in consumption in its entirety, depending on what is assumed 
about future income growth going forward, beyond the time horizon covered by the Michigan 
Survey of Consumers data set.   
 
Macro data: total real PCE 
Figure 1 displays the level of real PCE from  1962  to 2011:Q3. Even over this long 
horizon, the chart shows a flattening out of the consumption growth rate in 2008/2009. The 
fact that this pattern is clearly visible even over a period of almost 50 years highlights the 
severity and persistence of the Great Recession and the very slow recovery that is following it. 
 





Figure 2 shows that consumption growth outpaced  GDP growth through past 
recessionary periods. The nominal PCE-GDP ratio increases in each recession since 1962. In 
contrast, during the Great Recession, it increased more modestly.  Even after the recession, this 
ratio has either fallen or stagnated.  Thus, as a share of GDP, consumption has been hit harder 
than in previous recessions.  
 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Nominal PCE-GDP ratio 5 
 
Petev, Pistaferri, and Ecksten (2010) document that, while real per-capita consumption 
declines monotonically until the middle of 2009, real per-capita disposable income is relatively 
stable and that its decline was  significantly smaller. This  stability in per-capita income is 
explained entirely by a strong increase in government transfers to households, as wage and 
financial income fell. The increase in government transfers was partly due to higher take-up 
rates for unemployment insurance and food stamps, and partly due to the increased generosity 
of means-tested programs enacted by the legislators (such as extended unemployment benefits 
and increased in food stamps and emergency cash assistance). Given that these transfers are 
means-tested, they primarily help poorer households. Consistently with this finding, we find 
that in the Michigan Survey of Consumers the drop in income expectations over the next 12 
months of the poor-income households was smaller than the one for all other households.  
 
Figure  3  reports  a  spider chart comparing the time path of real PCE over several 
recessionary time periods. For each recession, the level of PCE is normalized to 1 at the NBER 
peak prior to the recession.  The NBER dates for the recessions peaks are 1973:Q4, 1980:Q1, 
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  Figure 3 highlights that in the 2008/2009 recession consumption dropped 3.4% from 
peak to trough (6 quarters after the peak) and was slow to recover afterwards. This contrasts 
with every recession since 1974. During all previous recessionary periods, either consumption 
fell only modestly or increased following the peak. 
 
Figure 4 displays the time path of the real PCE growth rate for the 2008/2009 recession 
around the NBER peak and compares it with the average real PCE growth rates from all other 
recessions since 1971. This graph shows that the average real PCE growth rate around the 
2008/2009 recession was significantly lower than the corresponding average over the previous 
five recessions. Consumption has grown 4.1% in total over the last 5 years, or an average rate 
of .8% per year.  This is in contrast with the fact that over the 1971-present consumption 
growth averaged 3.1% per year, adding up to about 15% growth over an average 5-year period.  
Thus, consumption expenditures are about 15%-4%=11% below what they would have been 
had they grown at their historical averages from 2007:Q4 onward.  
 
Figure 4.  Real total quarterly PCE growth over the 2008/2009 recession compared with the 
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All sub-components of PCE fell during the Great Recession. Durables  growth was 
somewhat weaker than in the previous five recessionary periods, both in terms of average 
growth rate and pattern of recovery. However, non-durables, and especially services, were the 
sub-components that were most depressed compared to the previous recessions.   
 
Total real PCE services 
Figure 5 highlights that the behavior of PCE services was starkly different over the last 
2008/2009 recession compared to all other recessions since 1974. In all other recessions PCE 
services grew both before and after the peak, while during the last recession, it stagnated 
starting 2 quarters after the peak (four quarters before the trough) and kept stagnating for four 
additional quarters afterwards. It took until Q4 2010 to return to peak levels. 
 
Figure 5. Spider chart comparing the time path of real PCE services over several recessionary 
time periods. For each recession, the level of PCE services is normalized to 1 at the NBER peak 
prior to the recession.  
 
 
Regarding the main services  subcomponents,  Petev, Pistaferri, and Ecksten (2010) 
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declined substantially for services related to transportation, food and recreation. In sum, the 
most adjustable services dropped, while those that the consumer has little flexibility about, did 
not.  
 
Total Real non-durables PCE  
  We can see from figure 6 that the rise in PCE non-durables was similar to most 
other recessions before the peak, but was among the worst of the recovery paths.  
 
Figure 6. Spider chart comparing the time path of real non-durables PCE    over several 
recessionary time periods. For each recession, the level of non-durables PCE is normalized to 1 




Petev, Pistaferri, and Ecksten (2010) document an unusual decline in food spending, a 
fundamental subsistence consumer category and a solid indicator of living standards, which 
raises concerns about the extent and depth of the strain that household underwent during the 
recession. An interesting new paper by Aguiar and Hurst (2011), however, documents that 
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home production. Including childcare, that fraction of time is 35%. This is an important channel 
that could produce more goods (such as food) and services (such as childcare) at a lower cost. 
More work is needed to determine if home production could completely explain the observed 
decline in food spending.  
 
Total real PCE durables   
Figure 7 displays a large drop for durables over the most recent recession. Five to six 
quarters after the peak, this recession actually displayed the largest drop in durables, compared 
to the previous five recessions, and while durable then started recovering, the speed of 
recovery was low, as it took 12 quarters to go back to the previous peak level.  
 
Figure 7. Spider chart comparing the time path of real durables PCE over several recessionary 
time periods. For each recession, the level of durables PCE is normalized to 1 at the NBER peak 
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Petev, Pistaferri, and Ecksten (2010) document that the bulk in the decline in real per-
capital spending is attributable to purchases of cars (a 25% decline by the end of 2008) and 
partly of furniture (a 9% decline).  
 
To summarize, our main findings from the macro data are as follows. First, the Great 
Recession marked the most severe and persistent decline in aggregate consumption since 
WWII. All subcomponents of consumption declined during this period. However, we find that 
the significant drop in consumed services stands out most compared to previous recessions. 
Second, while the decline was historic, the time path of consumption and its subcomponents 
leading up the recession was not substantially different from past recessionary periods.  Third, 
the recovery path of consumption following the Great Recession has been uncharacteristically 
weak. It took nearly three years for total consumption to return to its level just prior to the 
recession. In contrast, the second worst rebound observed in the data followed the 1974 
recession and was just over one year. We find that this persistence is reflected most in the 
subcomponents of non-durables and especially services consumption.    
 
The Micro evidence: expected income in the Michigan Survey of Consumers 
This section documents consumer expectations for future income, both in nominal and real 
terms, to see whether shocks to permanent income are contributing to the consumption dip. 
The survey asks two questions to identify the magnitude and sign of the income change. 
i)   “During the next 12 months, do you expect your income to be higher or lower than 
during the past year?”  
ii)  “By about what percent do you expect your income to (increase/decrease) during 
the next 12 months?” 
The resulting index of expected income growth ranges between +95 and -95 in the cross-
section and reflects the expected percent change in nominal income in the next year. The 
historical mean is +5.5%, split between +4.8% during recessions and +5.6% during expansions. 
Figure 8 below compares realized and expected nominal disposable income and shows that the 
two series track each other well. 11 
 
Figure 8. Realized and expected nominal annual disposable income growth 
 
 
The survey also asks about expected changes in the price level over the next 12 months. 
This number is historically very similar to realized CPI inflation. We construct expected real 
income  growth by subtracting each individual's inflation expectations from  his expected 
nominal income growth.  
We construct time series from the micro data. For each month of the survey we take cross-
sectional means within each demographic group  addressed below, and then aggregate to 
quarterly frequency to minimize noise. The data begin in 1978 and go through the first half of 




























































































































































































































































Nominal disposable income growth  Expected nominal income growth 12 
 
Nominal income growth expectations 
Except for the Great Recession and the 1980 recession, income expectations show a 
downward trend for up to four quarters around the NBER peak, but then stabilize and actually 
rise by the end of  our  4  year window  (see figure 9).  For both the 1980 and most recent 
recession, we observe larger and more prolonged dips.  Besides the abnormal drop, both in 
terms of size and duration, the recovery periods also stand out for their length and 
sluggishness. Even well after 10 quarters from the peak, expected nominal income growth was 
still well below the pre-recessionary periods. In terms of levels, it should be noted that the most 
recent recession is the only one during which nominal income expectations reached negative 
growth rates. Along all of the previous recessions that we study, even when nominal income 
growth rates go down, they stay well above 4%. Of course, inflation has been lower during the 
most recent recession. We will discuss real income patterns later.  
 










































































































































Quarters since peak 
Great Recession 2007:Q4  2001:Q1  1990:Q3  1981:Q3  1990:Q1 13 
 
Figure 10 shows that after the late 1970s, nominal income growth expectations have 
not varied by demographics  until the most recent recession.  Prime age individuals  (30-59) 
experienced the largest drop in expected nominal income growth during the Great Recession 
and are only partially recovering even 10 quarters after the peak. For younger consumers, 
expectations dropped well before, starting 5 quarters in advance, but then stabilized after the 
peak.  
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In past recession periods, nominal income expectations of the elderly population 
hovered around or just above zero. However, these expectations been markedly negative since 
the NBER peak in 2007:Q4.  Focusing on this population, Christelis, Georgarakos, and Jappelli 
(2011) use the 2009 Internet Survey of Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to look at the effects 
of three different shocks: the drop in house prices, the decline in the stock market, and the 
increase in unemployment, on households’ expenditures during the Great Recession. This data 
set refers to the population 50 and older. The HRS Internet Survey contains detailed measures 
of both housing wealth losses (between Summer 2006 and Mid-2009) and of losses in various 
financial assets (between October 2008 and Mid-2009). It also contains measures of 
consumption growth and qualitative indicators of consumption changes, allowing them to 
estimate the effect of the losses on adjustments in consumption expenditure. Their main 
finding is that capital losses (on housing and financial assets), as well as the income loss from 
becoming unemployed, lead households to reduce their spending. The estimated elasticity of 
consumption to financial wealth implies a marginal propensity to consume with respect to 
financial wealth equal to 3 percentage points. The decline in house prices also had an important 
impact on consumption: the estimated elasticity implies that the marginal propensity to 
consume is 1 percentage point.  Additionally, households in which at least one of the two 
partners in the main couple (or the single head) became unemployed in 2008 and early 2009 
reduced consumption by 10% in 2009. See Hurd and Rohwedder (2010a, 2010b) and the 
citations therein for more estimates on the responsiveness of consumption to asset and income 
shocks. 
Figure 11 shows that all income levels have adjusted their expected income growth 
downward during the most recent recession. In past recessions the adjustments were smaller. 
In the most recent recession, the 1st quintile (the poorest) dropped the least. By the end of 
2010 all income levels have roughly converged to the same post-peak level and are much closer 
together. This is consistent with Petev, Pistaferri, and Ecksten’s findings. First, they find that 
increased government transfers propped up income among the poorest-income households 
during the Great recession. Second, using the Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment, they 
document that high income people have become more pessimistic than other groups during 15 
 
the Great Recession.
2 Finally, using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), they find that 
respondents in the top decile of the wealth distribution are the ones who decrease spending 
during the Great Recession (-5.4%). This finding holds for the subcategories of nondurables and 
services. This drop in consumption might be due to the large negative wealth effect 
experienced by these households due to the decrease in house values and stock market 
valuation.  
Figure 11. Expected nominal income growth by income quintile.  
 
 
                                                           
2 As a possible explanation for the pessimism of the wealthy, Shapiro (2010) finds that these household were 
exposed more to the stock market and experienced larger declines in wealth as a consequence. The median 
decline in wealth was 15% in Shapiro’s data, and those who lost at least 10% of their net worth had almost twice 












































-16  -12  -8  -4  0  4  8  12  16 






































Quarters since peak 2001:Q1 
1st quintile  2nd quintile 







-16  -12  -8  -4  0  4  8  12  16 
Quarters since peak 2007:Q4 - Great Recession 
1st quintile  2nd quintile 
3rd quintile  4th quintile 




Figure 12  shows that in the previous recessions, income expectations by education 
groups were rather flat over the cycle. In the most recent recession, everyone reduced their 
expected income growth. 
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Real income growth expectations. 
Nominal income growth during the Great Recession was low, but inflation was also low. 
To study the behavior of real income expectations, we measure inflation in two ways. First, we 
use actual CPI inflation over  the 12 month period covered by the survey question, which 
assumes that consumers have perfect foresight over the next year concerning inflation. Second, 
we use the answer to the survey question about the individual’s expectation about growth in 
prices over the next 12 months.  Using these two measures,  we construct individual-level 
expected real income growth and then aggregate up to population-quarter means.  
The two inflation series have diverged in the past, but after the late 70s the differences 
are minor. At the start of the Great Recession, however, a large gap opened up, which makes 
for the largest discrepancy between these two data series. The swing in 2008 Q2 is +6% in 
expected inflation, compared to -1% actual CPI inflation. The two measures have since become 
closer together (see figure 13). The gap in these two measures of course impacts measured real 
income growth expectations as we document below. 
 
Figure 13. Time series of 12 months forward inflation since 1978, comparing CPI and personal 






































































































































































































































































CPI inflation  Consumer expected inflation 18 
 
 
In figure 14 there is no clear cyclical pattern prior to the Great Recession in real income 
expectations. Before the most recent recession, real income growth was rather flat, dropped 
into negative territory several quarters before the peak, but then went up to about 4% four 
quarters after the peak. From then on, however, it had a large drop, reaching -3% five quarters 
after the peak. In summary, real income growth expectations deflated by CPI  show a 
deterioration and lower average growth than during previous recessions. 
 




Figure 15 shows that perceived consumers’ real income growth using the consumers’ 
inflation expectactions provides a much more pessimistic outlook about consumers’ purchasing 
power during the Great Recession. Consumers’ perceived real income growth dipped in and out 




















































































































































Quarters since peak 
Great Recession 2007:Q4  2001:Q1  1990:Q3  1981:Q3  1980:Q1 19 
 
quarters before the peak. That drop brought expectations from almost +2% to -4% growth rate 
three quarters after the peak. It took two more quarters to go back up to a -2%  growth rate 
expectation, but there has been stagnation ever since. The recession window in figure 15 ends 
in Q4 2011 at an expected real income growth of -2.5%. In 2011 the series has recorded values 
of -3.1%, -3.7%, and -2.9% for quarters 1 through 3, respectively. 
Figure 15. Expected real income growth, using consumers’ inflation expectations. 
 
    
Our main findings from the analysis of the Micro data are as follows. First, expected nominal 
income growth declined significantly  during the Great Recession. It is the worst drop ever 
observed in these data, and it has not recovered to pre-recession levels. Second, the decline 
exists for all age groups, education levels, and  income quintiles.    Relative to previous 
recessions, those with higher levels of income and education are more pessimistic than their 






































































































































































Quarters since peak 
Great Recession 2007:Q4  2001:Q1  1990:Q3  1981:Q3  1980:Q1 20 
 
declined, and the decline in expected real income growth is more severe when personal 
inflation expectations are used instead of actual CPI inflation. 
 
Does the Michigan Expectations data have predictive power for future income 
and consumption growth? 
  Below we show that the Michigan data have a great deal of forecasting power for both 
future  disposable  income and consumption growth.
3  We estimate the regression  for 
disposable income first: 
 
4 01 4 4 2 (( )/ ) (( )/ ) tk tk tk t t t M t tk Y Y Y YY Y g αα α ε ++ + + − − + − = +− ++  
 
where  0 α , 1 α , 2 α are parameters to estimate and  1 α  and  2 α  are reported in the table below.  
The variable  4 (( )/ ) tk tk tk Y YY ++ + + −   is next year’s annual income growth k quarters from now, so 
k is 0 when forecasting income growth over the next year and 4 when forecasting income 
growth over the subsequent year.    44 (( )/ ) tt t YY Y −− −  is income growth over the last year and 
Mt g   is  expected  real  income growth from the Michigan survey, where we deflate using 
expected inflation from the Michigan survey.     
  As can be seen in table 1, lagged income growth has a negative coefficient and expected 
income growth has a positive coefficient.  For income growth over the next year the coefficient 
on expected income growth is .80, indicating that a 1% decline in expected income growth 
reduces next year’s income growth .80%, controlling for last year’s income growth.  The right 
hand column shows that predicted income growth over the next year (2011:Q3 to 2012:Q3) 
using lagged income growth and expected income growth is .6%, well below its average of 2.8% 
over the 1978-2011 sample period.  Income growth between 2012:Q3 and 2013:Q3 is also 
forecasted to be low. 
                                                           
3 See Souleles (2004), Ludvigson (2004), and Barsky and Sims (2009) for more on the predictive power of the 
Michigan surveys. 21 
 
Expected income growth is also a good predictor of consumption growth.  Table 1 also 
presents regressions using future consumption growth as the left hand side variable and lagged 
consumption growth and the Michigan expectations variable as the right hand side variables.  
The consumption forecast for 2011:Q3 to 2012:Q3 is for 0.1% growth.     
In short, the low expected income growth in the Michigan Consumer Survey data 
suggest that the US will experience low income and consumption growth over the next two 
years.  Obviously, there are many things not in our models so the estimates should only be 
taken as suggestive evidence.  However, the results are fairly robust to changes in model 
specification and adding a few other variables, such as the unemployment rate.   
  Table 1: Regression Results   
 
Lagged 













Q3/Q3  R-squared 
Annual income growth 1 
year forward 
-0.35  0.80  --  0.61*  0.29 
(0.10)  (0.17)   
 
 
Annual income growth 2 
years forward 
0.06  0.36  --  1.24**  0.08 
(0.08)  (0.17)   
 
 
Annual income growth 3 
years forward 
-0.34  0.42  --  2.16***  0.08 




growth 1 year forward 
--  0.71  0.08  0.05*  0.37 
 




growth 2 years forward 
--  0.77  -0.25  0.13**  0.18 
 




growth 3 years forward  
--  0.58  -0.49  1.15***  0.11 
 




growth 1 year forward 
-0.20  0.75  0.18  0.39*  0.39 




growth 2 years forward 
0.10  0.76  -0.31  -0.07**  0.17 




growth 3 years forward 
-0.09  0.59  -0.44  1.36***  0.11 




Regressions are run with data from 1978:Q1 to 2011:Q2. 
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. 
Average annual income and consumption growth are 2.78 and 2.91, respectively. 
Using data up to 2011:Q3, forecast of growth between: 
   *2011:Q3 and 2012:Q3 
   **2012:Q3 and 2013:Q3 
 22 
 
   ***2013:Q3 and 2014:Q3 
 
Using a simple model to quantify the effects of the drops in wealth and income 
expectations  
 Data from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ Flow of Funds shows that in 2008 
American households experienced a loss of $13.6 trillion in wealth, with most of the loss 
concentrated in stock market wealth.  Although stock market wealth partially recovered since 
then, housing wealth has continued to decline.  The resulting wealth loss, combined with lower 
expected income growth,  has the potential to explain why the consumers cut back 
consumption during the Great Recession to the extent that they did.  
We turn to quantifying the effects of these declines by first calibrating a simple model of 
consumption that matches the observed level of consumption in 2007:Q4, and that implies 
empirically plausible marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) out of assets and permanent 
income. Then, we show model predicted consumption in 2011:Q2 under different expectations 
for income and asset values. We find that for reasonable parameter values, the decline in 
assets can explain 1/3 of the gap between actual and potential consumption, while declines in 
permanent income expectations can easily explain the other 2/3 of the gap.   




Define  t C as consumption expenditures at time t (where time is measured in quarters). 











subject to the  following asset accumulation equation,   
2)  11 (1 ) 0 t tt t T A rA Y C A ++ =+ +−, ≥ 
 
0 t A given, and  given income expectations.  To avoid the additional complication of dealing with 
uncertainty, we assume that individuals are certain of future income. However, we allow them to revise 
their perceived income process if they make a mistake.  
The solution to the consumer’s problem is:  
























































































































































































































PCE  Counter-factual PCE 24 
 









= /+ ∑   
is the present value of future labor income.  
  We compute  t Y   by assuming that consumers observe income up to 2011:Q2 and that from that 
point on, income expectations for the next year are those measured in the most recent Michigan Survey 
of Consumers, but then revert to long run income growth afterwards.    
  Mathematically, we can write this as   
Yt+k = (1+gM)
kYt,  k ≤ 4 
Yt+k = (1+g)Yt+k−1, k > 4 
where Yt is disposable income, gM is the perceived real income growth for the next year in the 2010:Q4 
(the most recent release of this variable suggests even more pessimism on consumer’s part than in 
2010:Q4) Michigan Survey of Consumers, while g is the average growth rate of income over the last 40 
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  We call the income process above income process 1. Then, to show the importance of low 
expected income growth, we consider a more pessimistic scenario, which we call income process 2, in 
which rather than reverting back to a long-run expected growth after four quarters, pessimism about 
























  Figure 17 reports four different lines for the time path of real disposable income since the 
beginning of 2007. The top crossed line shows counterfactual disposable income level, had it continued 
to grow at its historical average rate of 3.2% from 2007:Q4 on.  The triangle line shows realized 
disposable income up to 2011:Q2. The dashed line begins with realized disposable income in 2011:Q2. It 
then tacks on the expected level of disposable income using expectation data from the Michigan Survey 
of Consumers for all periods thereafter. This corresponds to income process 2.  The dotted line begins in 
2012:Q2, assuming that income grows according to the Michigan Survey of Consumers between 
2011:Q2 and 2012:Q4, and then grows at its historical rate afterwards. It corresponds to income process 
1.   







  The three key moments we wish to match are the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of 
assets, the MPC out of permanent income, and the level of consumption in 2007:Q4.  
  Most estimates of the MPC out of assets are around .01-.05 and most estimates of the MPC out 
of permanent income are around .5-1. We assume the MPC out of assets is .03 per year. We use per 
capita income growth for the individual’s decision problem. Thus we set  032 014 018 g =. −. =.  
(average disposable income growth over the 1967:4 to 2007:4 period less population growth of those 
age 16+ over the same time period). We pick r and β to match the MPC out of assets and the level of 































































































































































































































































Disposable income  Counter-factual disposable income 
Income process 1  Income process 2 27 
 
2007 4 2007 4 2007 4
1









Where  C2007:Q4 = $9,312.6 billion (at an annualized rate), Y2007:Q4 = $9,944 billion (annualized), and A2007:Q4 
= $69,139 billion.  
  The unit of time in this analysis is a quarter, although so far we have been discussing all 
calibrations at annualized rates.  We convert annual growth rates to quarterly ones, using the formula 
(1/4) (1 ) 1 g +−  when taking the quarterly growth rate for g.  For dollar amounts, we divide by 4.  After 
converting everything to quarterly rates, we use the above two equations to solve for β and r.  Table 1 
presents all variables at quarterly and annualized rates.  At annualized rates, β = .97 and  
r=.060.This gives a quarterly MPC out of permanent income equal to  







= −β + / − =.
∂  
which is consistent with the evidence in the literature.   
  Over the last 40 years annual population growth for those aged 16+ is 1.4%, which we define as 
p.  We assume this rate of population growth continues on into the future. Income growth in the 
individual’s decision problem is in per capita terms. We then account for aggregate growth at the end by 




Table 1: Model Parameters  Annual  Quarterly 
Exogenously set 
   
 
-0.016  -0.0040 
Population growth  0.014  0.0035 
g  0.018  0.0045 
MPC out of assets  0.03  0.0074 
M g28 
 
      Y2007:Q4   9,944  2486 
C2007:Q5  9,313  2,328 
A2007:Q4  69,139  69,139 
Endogenously determined 
    β  0.97  0.993 
r  0.060  0.015 





Table 2 explains our key findings.  All quarterly numbers in this section are annualized; i.e., they are the 
quarterly numbers multiplied by 4.  Consumption expenditures in 2011:Q2 were $9.379 trillion. Had 
they grown at average rates from 2007:Q4 on, they would have been at $10.472 trillion in 2011:Q2, 
which is 10% higher than it is today. This difference of $1.069 trillion, line 3 of the table, is the shortfall 
we seek to explain with the model. Figure 16 depicts this shortfall graphically.  
Table 2: Results    
Realized consumption level 2011:Q2  9379 
Predicted consumption level 2011:Q2 given information in 2007:Q4  10472 
Consumption loss  1093 
Consumption loss due to asset value decline 
  Asset value decline  9746 
Predicted consumption decline due to asset price decline  289 
Consumption loss given disposable income decline 
  Income process 1  917 
Income process 1 and lower short-term interest rate  710 
Income process 2  4038 
Consumption loss given both asset and income declines 
  Income process 1  1206 
Income process 1 and lower short-term interest rate   999 
Income process 2  4328 
Note: All amounts in Billions of dollars 
  Lines 5 and 6 in Table 2 study the effects of the decline in asset prices. Net worth fell $9.746 trillion in 
real terms over this time period. Given a quarterly MPC of .0074, we predict a ($9.746 trillion)X(.0074)X4 
= $.289 trillion fall in consumption, at an annualized rate.  29 
 
  The following lines in the table predict the consumption fall due to various permanent income 
scenarios. To perform this computation, we first put ourselves in 2007:Q4 and predict Y  as of 2011:Q2, 
had income grown steadily at its long-run historical average. Second, we  calculateY  given realized 
income in 2007:Q4 and the two income processes that we have described previously. To be clear, taking 
into account population growth rates, we calculate  2011 2 Q Y :  , given information set from 2007:Q4 = 
14 1
2007 4 2007 4 ((1 )(1 )) r
QQ rg Y Y pg +
:: − = ++,  where 14 is the number of quarters between 2007:Q2 and 
2011:Q4.  
  Once we calculate the loss in Y  under different income and interest rate scenarios, we use the 
model to calculate the resulting consumption loss. The consumption loss associated with income 
process  1 is $0.917  trillion, which is reasonably close to the observed consumption loss.  This 
computation is sensitive to the time path of the interest rate as well. The baseline calibration yields a 
yearly interest rate of 6%. In the lower short term interest rate scenario we assume that over the first 
year the yearly interest rate is 3% and then reverts back to 6%. In this case, income is less heavily 
discounted, hence its present value is higher and the implied consumption drop is $710 billion rather 
than $917 billion. Unsurprisingly, the very pessimistic income expectation scenario considered in Income 
process 2, generates a huge consumption loss of $4.038 trillion, which is almost 4 times larger than the 
consumption shortfall we wish to explain.  
  Because our model predicts that consumption is linear in resources (assets and the present 
value of future income), we can add up losses from assets and income. Note that the predicted 
consumption decline given the asset fall plus the predicted decline given income process 1 of $1.206 





This article documents key facts about aggregate consumption and its subcomponents 
and looks at the behavior of important determinants of consumption over the cycle, such as 
consumption is consumer’s expectations about their future income, and changes in the 
consumers’ wealth positions due to changes in house prices and stock valuation. We performed 
a simple computation to determine whether the observed drop in consumption can be 
explained by the observed drops in wealth and income expectations. 
In the context of a simple permanent income model, we find that the negative wealth 
effect (coming from decreased stock market valuation and housing prices) and decreased 
consumer’s income expectations were big factors in determining the observed consumption 
drop. In fact, we find that in this model the observed drops in wealth and income expectations 
can explain the observed drop in consumption in its entirety, depending on what is assumed 
about future income growth going forward, beyond the time horizon covered by the Michigan 
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